Power Plant Siting: A Paretian Environmental Approach by Gros, J.G.
R R  - 7 5 - 4 4  
Reprint 
NUCLEAR ENGlNEERlNG AND DESIGN 34 (1975) 281-292. Q NORTH-HOLLAND PUBLISHING COMPANY 
POWER PLANT SITlNG: A PARETIAN ENVlRONMENTAL APPROACH 
Jacques GROS 
Inrernarional Insrirure for Applied Systems Analysis, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria 
Received 22 March 1975 
Several different interest groups are involved in the siting decision process for nuclear power plants. Their inputs and 
how the final decision affects them are usually not explicitly included in mathematical analyses. Paretian analysis is 
a technique which attempts to identify the preferences of each of the interest groups involved in the decision-making 
process, and to illuminate the trade-offs among these groups. The specific problem studied is the deployment by a 
regional power plant siting agency of nuclear base-load power plants to  coastal sites in New England. Four interest 
groups participate in power plant siting decisions; utility functions can represent their preferences. Techniques to  
find Pareto-admissible decisions are described. 
1 .  Introduction 
A host of administrative, regulatory, judicial and 
advisory bodies at the federal, state and local levels 
participate in the process of site selection and licensing 
of major power facilities. They - along with various 
private and public intervenors, as well as the power 
utilities - take part in a complex decision-malung 
process with a highly controversial set of choices. Yet 
state and local agencies have a severely limited capacity 
to conduct their own analyses of many of the issues 
they are called on to decide. At present, the power 
utilities conduct extensive studies of system design 
and operation before deciding the type, size and 
location of a new generating plant or transmission 
line. In general, the analysis is done by Westinghouse 
or General Electric, as a contracted service, using 
computer packages developed by these large equipment 
manufacturers. Unfortunately, the results d o  not fulfil 
the needs of regulatory agencies and other interested 
parties in siting disputes. The computer packages are 
designed to tell a utility which development pattern 
is in its best interest and to provide guidance for day- 
to-day management of the preferred system. Conse- 
quently, they supply a great deal of detail about 
forecasting loads, network reliability, scheduling of 
maintenance, system load dispatching, system costs, 
and financial considerations. According to published 
accounts, however, the studies rarely consider broad 
trade-offs among the different interests that are in 
conflict over any siting plan. After all, siting has 
become an adversary process, and power utilities can 
be expected to  use the analysis to support their own 
position. 
In this situation, public officials who must weigh 
the trade-offs between power cost and environmental 
damage are more or less at the mercy of the analysis 
provided by the utilities. Power systems are complex, 
and without an independent source of information it 
is not easy for these officials t o  question proposed 
plans or to evaluate the implications of possible modi- 
fications in plant location or design. Administrative 
bodies setting environmental standards (e.g. the 
maximum end-of-pipe temperature) must also work 
with little or no independent analysis of the effect of 
different emissions standards on system cost or of the 
trade-offs that must be made among different environ- 
mental values. 
Environmental groups are in a similar predicament. 
Most want to be responsible critics and are trying to 
minimize the environmental cost of the inevitable 
growth in power facilities. But since they lack the 
capacity to analyze choices and trade-offs, their natural 
response is to  oppose each and every plant and t o  
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fight for tighter environmental standards whenever 
the opportunity arises. It seems clear that even the 
power utilities would benefit if analytical capacity 
were more generally available - though they should 
not necessarily be expected to  provide it and might 
inevitably be suspect if they tried. What is needed is a 
flexible, low-cost analytic package that will allow 
public agencies and private groups to  conduct their 
own analyses of major choices. The analysis should 
cover the principal siting and design decisions and 
evaluate their consequences for the various interested 
parties. A carefully focused modeling effort will be 
required t o  meet this need. 
An excellent framework for research on  the topic 
is provided by the approach we refer t o  as Paretian 
environmental analysis [ l ]  . This type of analysis, in 
which the interested parties are considered explicitly, 
resembles what is called 'multi-objective planning' in 
the literature on applied microeconomics and benefit- 
cost analysis. The two types of analyses are similar 
mathematically, but differ in that conventional multi- 
objective planning usually considers trade-offs among 
abstractly defined social objectives (such as national 
income or income distribution), whereas Paretian 
analysis considers the interested parties that are 
actually involved in trying to influence a public 
decision, or that are affected by it ,  and calculates the 
preference function values as perceived by these parties. 
In this paper Paretian analysis is applied t o  the problem 
of the deployment of 1000 MW nuclear base-load units 
t o  coastal sites in New England. 
2. The Paretian model 
The Paretian model can be described algebraically as 
follows. Let the decision vector be X ,  a vector whose 
elements are the variables relevant to  the particular 
public decision. For example, in an application t o  a 
power plant siting problem with n sites, X can be 
represented as (QI ,  ( 2 2 ,  . . ., Q n Y x 1  , X Z ,  . . . , xn) ,  
where Qi is the thermal pollution level a t  site i when 
there is thermal pollution abatement equipment xi 
at the site. Assumptions about the possible policy 
options help t o  determine the feasible elements of  X. 
The quality levels Q = ( e l ,  Q 2 ,  . . ., Qn)  and the 
thermal pollution abatement equipment options x = 
(xl, x 2 ,  . . ., x,) are related. Let the set of equations 
T(X) = 0 describe the technological relation. There 
may be a set of constraints on the decision process, 
such as Q < Q*, where Q* is a vector of the quality 
standards. Summarize all these technological, economic, 
legal and political constraints and relations by @(X) < 0, 
where @ ( X )  is a vector of  the relevant transformations. 
Let NB'(X) correspond t o  the preference ordering 
for the ith interest group from decision X ,  with NB'(X) 
> NBi(Y) if X is preferred over Y. Suppose that X and 
Yare two feasible decisions and that NB'(X) > NBi(Y) 
for all interest groups i. Decision Y should not  be 
adopted because every participant will prefer decision 
X. Similarly, if NB'(X) 2 NB'(Y) for all interest groups, 
and if NB'(X) > NB'(Y) for at  least one of them, then 
Y should not be chosen, since another decision exists 
that is preferred by some interest groups and is not 
detrimental to  the interests of any other interest group. 
Such a decision Y is said t o  be inadmissible. On the 
other hand, a decision Y is Pareto admissible if it is 
feasible and if there does not exist any alternative 
feasible decision X for which NB'(X) 2 NBi(Y) for 
all interest groups i ,  with strict inequality holding 
for a t  least one of them. The set of Pareto-admissible 
decisions constitutes the Pareto frontier. 
To  find the Pareto-admissible points a set of auxiliary 
problems is defined as follows. Choose a set of positive 
numbers wi, one for each interest group, and use these 
numbers to  form the objective function W = ~ ~ w f l B ' ( X ) .  
Then find a decision X with a feasible outcome [@(X) < 
0] that makes Was large as possible. Decision X i s  a 
Pareto-admissible point. The numbers wi are called 
political weights since their values reflect the relative 
marginal weightirig of the net benefits of interest groups 
in the determination of the particular Pareto-admissible 
decision. 
The application of Paretian analysis requires six 
steps: definition of the problem, identification of the 
interest groups, determination of the technological 
relations, estimation of the preference functions, 
determination of the Pareto frontier, and analysis of 
the results. In the discussion that follows emphasis 
will be put on the method of determining the prefer- 
ence functions. 
2.1. Definition 
The public decision studied in this paper is the design 
and deployment by a regional power plant siting 
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agency of 1030 MW nuclear base-load units to  coastal 
sites in New England. In this analysis, the decision is 
twofold: whether t o  use a particular site and what 
thermal pollution abatement system t o  build at the 
site. Much of the difficulty in defining the public de- 
cision is in specifying the available policy alternatives 
and the constraints. For example, federal water quality 
standards limit the set of available control measures 
for regulating thermal pollution. But these standards 
can change while the decision is being made, or before 
the decision is implemented. Therefore, the results of 
Paretian analysis will depend on both the standards 
and the variability of the standards. One aim of this 
analysis is t o  make it possible t o  model the uncertainty 
in some simple fashion. 
2.2. Identification of interest groups 
Step two in Paretian analysis is the identification of  
the interest groups that are affected by the decision 
or that take part in the decision process. The attempt 
to identify these groups and t o  quantify their preference 
functions distinguishes Paretian analysis from other 
types of analyses. A difficult problem in Paretian 
analysis is deciding t o  what extent the interest groups 
should be identified. It would be nice to  represent as 
an explicit interest group each real-world group which 
has a distinct preference function that is affected by 
the decision. Unfortunately, too large a number of 
interest groups makes the analysis and interpretation 
of the Pareto frontier very awkward; it is therefore 
necessary t o  aggregate and simplify the interest groups. 
For the Paretian analysis of power plant siting, four 
interest groups that participate in the decision process 
have been identified: electric utilities, regulatory 
agencies, environmentalists and local interests. Each 
of lhese interest groups consists of organizations with 
different concerns. 
2.2.1. 7he electric utilities 
A total of 147 organizations - investor-owned utilities, 
municipally-owned utilities, and cooperatives - are 
involved in providing electricity in New England. The 
interests of these organizations vary. Investor-owned 
companies are interested in maintaining an adequate 
profit level and in meeting demand and avoiding outages, 
fish kills, etc.; municipals and cooperatives are less 
profit-oriented than the investor-owned companies. 
Companies that generate electricity obviously have 
different interests than those that buy. Another con- 
flict, more common in the past, is between small and 
large utilitizs. Small utilities were excluded by the 
larger ones from part ownership of large, efficient 
base-load plants. The small utilities could not build 
such large plants themselves because they could not 
use so much additional capacity, so they were forced 
either t o  buy bulk electricity from the large utilities 
or t o  generate their own electricity in less efficient 
plants. 
There is much more cooperation among utilities 
on siting matters now than in the past?. Under the 
NEPOOL agreement utility companies are now planning 
their investment decisions together. As a result, large 
electric companies are spreading their generation 
capacity over a sizable number of  plants, either by 
part ownership or by long-term contract, instead of 
building large plants entirely for themselves. Utilities 
are no longer constrained to build plants in their own 
service areas; for example, Boston Edison's Pilgrim 
Nuclear Station is in the service area of the New 
England Gas and Electric Association. The electric 
companies of New England have formed a new organ- 
ization, the Yankee Atomic Electric Company, to  
supervise the design and construction of nuclear plants 
throughout New England. For this analysis, the electric 
utility industry has been treated as one interest group. 
2.2.2. Regulatory agencies 
This interest group includes the many state and 
federal agencies that regulate the electric utility 
industry, each of  which has its own particular interest. 
The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, for 
example, is concerned with the financing of the electric 
t To achieve economies of scale in generation and economies 
in system dispatch, New England utilities have started region- 
wide planning. The major investor-owned utilities and some 
of the municipals and cooperatives are parties t o  the New 
England Power Pool (NEPOOL) Agreement. The  objectives of 
NEPOOL are 'joint planning, central dispatching, cooperation 
in environmental matters and coordinated construction, 
operation and maintenance of electric generation and trans- 
mission facilities' in order to attain an efficient and reliable 
regional power supply. Regional coordination of planning 
depends on a set of interutility committees supported by a 
shared planning staff (NEPLAN). Centralized load dispatching 
has been achieved through a New England Power Exchange 
(NEPEX). 
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companies and the erection of transmission lines. Other 
agencies, such as the Division of Marine Fisheries, are 
concerned with particular environmental effects. In 
most cases these agencies can only act forcibly when 
the utility applies for permits after a plant has been 
built. The threat of regulatory action after a plant has 
been built has given the regulatory agencies some 
influence over design and siting decisions. The various 
state agencies' views are coordinated in Massachusetts 
by the newly formed technical committee, which has 
asked utility companies for studies of environmental 
effects of existing and proposed plants. The attitudes 
of state agencies toward specific siting decisions are 
also effectively coordinated by a staff member from 
the state's attorney general's office who represents 
the state at federal hearings. 
The regulatory agencies and laws of  different states 
often conflict with each other. For example, the 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station is located in 
Vermont but the cooling water comes from New 
Hampshire and heated cooling water flows through 
Massachusetts. Each of these states has different 
thermal pollution regulations and there has been 
litigation t o  determine which state's regulations should 
be followed. 
2.2.3. Environmentalists 
This is a catchall category for groups with a number 
of different concerns. In New England at  least three 
subcategories of people and organizations are worth 
mentioning: 
(1) those concerned with nuclear hazard, such as 
the Union of Concerned Scientists; 
(2) those concerned with air and water pollution, 
such as the Sierra Club; and 
(3) those opposed to power facilities on aesthetic 
grounds - for example, local groups organized around 
a specific issue. 
This interest group should not  be associated exclusively 
with its more vocal spokesmen, however. There is a 
general public concern with environmental protection 
with deserves to  be accounted for. 
On the issue of nuclear power plant siting, a local 
group usually leads the environmental effort and hires 
counsel to  represent its viewpoint at the local AEC 
hearings. (Because of the expense, there is usually 
only one environmental counsel a t  the hearings.) All 
of these local groups are similar, although they are active 
in different geographical regions and participate in the 
decisions for different plants. They are often represented 
by the same law firm, hire the same expert witnesses, 
share information, and aid each other in formulating 
strategy. Unfortunately, these groups first participate 
in the decision process at the hearings on a particular 
plant, after many of the design decisions have already 
been made. Under most proposed power plant siting 
legislation, the environmental groups would participate 
earlier in the decision process, when alternative designs 
are still feasible. 
2.2.4. Local interests 
C)ften state and local governments like to  have large 
power generating facilities located within their bound- 
aries because they are a source of  tax revenue. A local 
community in which a nuclear plant is built is obviously 
affected, as are the surrounding towns. Plant construction 
has immediate environmental and aesthetic impacts, 
and once the plant is built there are further effects, such 
as the increase in the end-of-pipe temperature of the 
plant and the greater danger of high radiation level;. 
The economic effects are also considerable: in addition 
t o  the higher tax base, employment opportunities and 
general commerce increase; however, the plant may 
interfere with established commercial activities such 
as fishing, lobster trapping and Irish Moss harvesting. 
A local community must choose whether to  support 
or to  fight a proposed plant, whose presence in the 
community may evenually change its character 
completely 121. 
The influence of local jurisdictions in siting decisions 
should diminish in the future as state government 
agencies get increased powers to  overrule local zoning 
decisions. 
Once the interest groups have been identified, a 
related problem is: who should be interviewed to 
determine their preferences? For each interest group 
a knowledgeable observer familiar with many of the 
group members' preferences was chosen t o  assess the 
preference function for the group. The functions were 
verified for reasonableness by group members. 
2.3. Analytic techniques atld technological relatiot~s 
To better explain the relevant technological relations 
and the need for preference functions I will describe an 
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analytic technique used to obtain Pareto-admissible 
decisions. The model described in this paper is a long- 
run model. It covers nuclear base-load units only, and 
does not reflect the fact that the power system of New 
England serves different states or that it is made up 
of different companies. The model is based on the 
following assumptions: 
(1) All power plants will consist of four 1000 MW 
units, with two years between the construction of units 
a t  a site. At present nuclear base-load units exhibit 
economies of scale up to around 1000 MW; new power 
stations in the early 1980s will be of approximately 
this size. Construction costs are minimized if units 
are built two years apart, since one construction crew 
can then build all four units. Let v ,  the vintage of  the 
plant, refer to  the year of commissioning of the first 
unit at a site. 
(2) All the monetary costs and environmental effects 
can be assigned to the plant site. This means, for 
instance, that the cost of the transmission link t o  the 
New England high-voltage grid must be added t o  plant 
cost. It is also necessary to  estimate the difference in 
transmission losses among sites and correct the capital 
and operating costs accordingly. It should be possible 
to  estimate these quantities within a small margn  of 
error, perhaps 1-2%. Localizing environmental effects 
to the generating site means that the environmental 
effects from one site do not change the level of the 
environmental effects from another site. 
With these assumptions, the long-run power plant 
siting problem can be expressed as an assignment linear 
programming problem. Data management and specifi- 
cation of the objective function may preseiit problems, 
but the computation costs are low on a digital computer; 
it is the kind of model a public agency could afford to  
maintain and operate. 
The model can be set up as follo~vs. A site k is 
defined as a place that can accommodate one plant 
consisting of four 1000 MW electric generating units. 
At each site in each vintage year v  a number of con- 
figurations of pollution abatement equipment can be 
considered. However, for each combination (k, v )  it is 
possible t o  identify the best plant design j since all 
the monetary costs and environmental effects can be 
assigned t o  the plant site and the objective function 
for this decision depends only on the conditions at 
the site (and not on the conditions at the other sites). 
Therefore the problem breaks conveniently into two 
parts: ( I )  determine the best plant type for each site 
and vintage (the design decision); and (2) decide what 
combination of site developments over time is prefer- 
able (the deployment decision). 
The plant types considered a t  any site will differ 
from one another in the stringency of controls on heat 
discharge to  natural waters. Because of the difficulties 
of preparing data, it is not  feasible t o  work with con- 
figurations of  equipment for the continuous range of 
heat discharge; we must work with discrete alternatives 
in choosing plant designs. Thus we shall develop 
designs by setting alternative constraints on thermal 
pollution and solving for the minimum-cost design 
that will meet these conditions. 
We can then take these designs and evaluate each 
under the objective function for the auxiliary problem 
o f  Paretian analysis t o  define 
where wi is the political weight and Pi(k, j ,  v )  is the 
preference function value for interest group i for the 
plant of vintage v ,  design j, at site k. The term Akju 
can be described as the contribution of a particular 
installation to  a Paretian objective function. The best 
design for site k of vintage v can be found by taking 
maxi A k j u ;  the objective function value for this 
best design under the assumed conditions can be 
denoted A k v .  Naturally, the value of  Aku and associated 
plant designs may be different for different political 
weights. 
t The above equation is for conditions of certainty. Consider 
the scenario where with probability p the federal government 
will restrict the generating units to closed cooling systems. 
Let us assume, for convenience, that the government will 
decide whether to require closed cooling systems after the 
deployment decision is made, but in enough time for plant 
designs to change without a severe cost penalty. Under this 
scenario, 
whereP,!(k, j ' ,  v )  is the preference function value for the 
situation in which the restriction to closed cooling systems 
is in effect (design j' is for closed cooling systems), and 
Pi(k, j ,  u )  is the preference function value for the situation in 
which the restriction is not in effect. (The restriction is not 
in effect with probability 1 - p . )  
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The long-run planning problem can now be stated 
as follows: 
subject t o  a constraint that specifies the number of 
new base-load plants Nu that must be committed in 
each period v ,  ZkYku = N,? ,  and subject to  a constraint 
that allows only one plant a t  each site, ZuYku = 1, 
where Ykv = 0 or 1. T o  accommodate sites that are 
not used in the planning period, enough additional years 
are included so  that each site is 'used' a t  some time. If 
the solution indicates that a site should be used after 
the planning period, then the site remains undeveloped. 
The third step in applying Paretian analysis is the 
determination of the relevant technological relations, 
that is, the effects of the decision alternatives on each 
of the interest groups. As should be apparent from 
the discussion o f  the analytic technique used, the tech- 
nological relations include the effects of various kinds 
of thermal pollution abatement equipment as well as 
the costs of  transmitting electricity. Costs and thermal 
effects of using once-through cooling and spray canals 
are calculated using a computer routine developed by  
Shiers and Marks [3] . The cost of transmitting elec- 
tricity is the sum of the capital and operating costs of 
the transmission lines and the transmission losses. 
2.4. Preference function theory 
Siting decisions involve more than just monetary costs; 
surrounding population, ambient water conditions 
and existing development at  the site are also important 
inputs t o  the decision. Thus in modeling the power 
plant siting decision process the analyst must obtain 
an objective function including the multiple attributes 
which describe the effectiveness of a decision. Such 
an objective function would indicate the relative 
ranking of consequences and identify the trade-offs 
among various levels of the different attributes. In a 
t Because of the cost structure of the electric power industry 
(low cost of transmission relative to  generation), there is no 
incentive to install base-load plants before they are needed, so 
it is reasonable to express the constraints as shown, instead of  
as the inequality 2 k  Y k ,  2 NU. 
risk-free environment, the optimal decision would be 
the one that maximizes the objective function. 
But the power plant siting decision problem can 
involve uncertainties. For instance, the regulatory 
process which governs such decisions may change in 
some unpredictable fashion. This type of uncertainty 
should be considered in the modeling effort and the 
objective function should allow the uncertainty t o  be 
handled easily. One approach is t o  design an objective 
function such that the decision which maximizes the 
expected value of  the objective function is the optimal 
decision. Such an objective function is usually called a 
utility function; because of  the possible confusion in 
referring t o  the utility function for utility companies, 
I wdl often call i t  a preference function. 
There are several ways of assessing a utility function. 
A direct approach would have the assessor consider this 
multidimensional problem as a whole, assessing prefer- 
ences for sets of attributes in the several years. This is 
an enormously time-consuming process, with n o  
guarantee of consistency, since people have trouble 
visualizing trade-offs in more than one dimension. To 
have the assessment made in less time the problem should 
be broken down into its simpler components and then 
reconstructed. 
By asking simple questions about trade-offs between 
quantities, the decision analyst can find a preference 
function that can serve as a guide in decision making. 
If the consequences chosen satisfy certain independence 
properties, the assessment problem is simplified. The 
two independence properties to  be considered are 
preferential independence and utility independence. 
Let us define a set of consequences which describe 
the effects of power plant siting decisions. Let X  = 
X 1 X 2 X 3  . . . X N  be a consequence space, where each 
X i ,  the ith consequence, can represent an attribute in 
one year, a set of attributes, etc.; let xi represent a 
particular value of the consequence. Let the complement 
of consequence X i ,  denoted ~ f ,  be the space defined 
by all the consequences except the ith consequence. 
This complement can be written as 
Similarly, the complement of  two consequences, Xi  
and Xi,  can be written as 
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Consider the situation in which the decision-maker 
is asked to rank values of pairs of consequences. In 
particular, consider the case in which consequences i 
and j can vary over their complete range of values and 
the other consequences have an arbitrary (futed) set 
of values. If the ranking of values of consequences i 
and j does not depend on the fixed value of the other 
consequences, this pair of consequences is said to be 
preferentially independent of the other consequences. 
Formally, the consequence pair XiXi is said to be 
preferentially independent of its complement xi' if 
the preference order for consequences (xi, xi, xij) 
with Xji held fixed does not depend on the fixed 
amount x:,. Thus the conditions necessary for prefer- 
ential independence to hold, express a property of the 
decision-maker's preference for choices between definite 
(certain) consequencest. 
The conditions for utility independence, on the 
other hand, depend upon the decision maker's prefer- 
ence for lotteries involving uncertainty. Consider the 
situation in which the decision maker is asked to rank 
lotteries on the ith consequence. For each specific 
lottery, let the value of the ith consequence be deter- 
mined by a specific random variable, whde all other 
consequences have an arbitrary (fixed) set of values. A 
set of random variables yields a set of lotteries. If the 
ranking of these lotteries on the ith consequence does 
not depend on the fixed value of  the other consequences, 
the ith consequence is said to be utility independent of 
the other consequences. Formally, consequence Xi is 
said to be utility independent of its complement Xi if 
the preference order for lotteries with only Xi varying, 
represented as (E,, xj) with X: held fixed, does not 
depend on the fixed amount xi. 
If each consequence is utility independent of its 
complement, and each pair of consequences is preferen- 
tially independent of its complement, then the multi- 
?Consider, for example, a young child deciding what t o  order 
at a restaurant. The child is to choose an appetizer, an entrie 
and a dessert from the menu. Let us assume that the child is, 
as most children are, most interested in what hejshe is having 
for dessert. He/she therefore considers the first dessert and con- 
siders (ranks) all combinations o f  appetizers and entries. The 
process is repeated with the second dessert, etc. If the 
ranking of  pairs of appetizers and entries is independent o f  
the dessert being considered, then the consequence pair 
(appetizer, entrie) is preferentially independent of  dessert. 
consequence utility function U(X) takes either of two 
special forms [4] : 
pure product 
pure sum 
U(Xj = clU,(X1)  +c,U2(X2) + . . . + cNUN(XN). 
In both equations, U(X) and Ui(Xi) are utility functions 
scaled from zero for the worst state to one for the best 
state; the ci's are scaling constants with 0 < ci < 1; and 
c > - 1 is a scaling constant. The two pure forms corre- 
spond to different preference orderings for multi- 
consequence lotteries. Let us consider lotteries involving 
just the best outcome and worst outcome of each 
consequence. Let there be a lottery, lottery 1, in which 
the values of the N consequences are determined by 
N independent two-pronged lotteries, each giving a 
chance p at the preferred outcome and a chance (1 - p) 
at the worst outcome. Let there be a second lottery, 
lottery 2 ,  in which the values of the N consequences 
are determined by a single two -pronged lotteiy, with 
a chance p of getting the preferred outcome of each 
consequence and a chance (1 - p)  of getting the 
worst outcome of each consequence. A preference 
for lottery 1 over lottery 2 shows a kind of risk 
aversion; that is, the assessor would rather have a 
mix of 'best' and 'worst' consequence values than an 
'all-or-nothing' proposition [S] . Multivariate risk in- 
difference means the assessor has n o  preference for 
either lottery, while multivariate risk-seeking corre- 
sponds to  a preference for lottery 2 over lottery 1. 
The pure product form of the multi-consequence 
preference function exhibits multi-consequence risk- 
aversion or risk-seeking; the pure sum exhibits multi- 
consequence risk indifference. 
The same information is needed to specify both 
the pure product and pure sum forms. In each case, 
N single-consequence utility functions Ui(Xi) and N 
scaling constants ci must be obtained. When Xi is a 
continuous consequence, the single-consequence utility 
function U,{Xi) can be obtained as follows. Determine 
the feasible range of values from the most preferred 
value (denoted x f )  to the least preferred value (denoted 
xi*)  so that the single-consequence utility function is 
scaled from zero to one; let Ui(xi.) = 0 and Uj(xt) = 1. 
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Next, consider the lottery with a 0.5 chance of obtain- 
ing xf  and a 0.5 chance of obtainingxit. Find a value 
xf such that the decision-maker is indifferent to a choice 
between the lottery and the certain consequence. (Since 
Xi is utility independent of its complement, this in- 
difference point xf  can be obtained with each of the 
other consequences set at  any arbitrary value.) Since 
the expected utility of the lottery is 0.5, the indifference 
point x f  has a utility value of 0.5. Repeating the 
process using indifference point x f  and the most pre- 
ferred value xi* in a lottery, the consequence value 
with 0.75 utility value can be found. Similarly, using 
the least preferred value, the consequence value with 
0.25 utility value can be found. These five points (the 
points with utility value 0 ,  0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1) define 
a utility curve for a single consequence. Standard tech- 
niques are available to make consistency checks and to 
fit piecewise continuous functions to the points [6, 71. 
When Xi has only discrete values, this method for 
assessing Ui(Xi) cannot be used, since there is no 
guarantee that the indifference points will be at  one 
of the values of the ith consequence. When Xi is a 
discrete consequence, the single-consequence utility 
function Ui(Xi) can be obtained as follows. Determine 
the feasible set of values from the most preferred 
value (x l )  to the least preferred value (xi*). As before, 
let Udxi*) = 0 and Ui(xl) = 1. Consider the following 
two alternatives: ( I )  the lottery with a chance p of 
obtaining x f  and a chance (1 - p) of obtaining xi. ; 
and (2) the certainty of obtaining x i .  The problem is 
to find the odds which make the decision-maker 
indifferent to the choice between these two alter- 
natives. Since the expected utility of the lottery is 
p ,  xf  has a utility value of p .  The process is repeated 
with other triplets of consequence values until enough 
indifference probabilities have been obtained to  
specify a utility value for each discrete consequence 
value. 
To combine the single-consequence utility functions 
obtained by the above procedure into a single, multi- 
consequence utility function of the pure sum or 
pure product form, a set of scaling questions could 
be devised. Such a scaling question for ci would ask: 
'For what probability p is the decision-maker indifferent 
to the choice between: 
( I )  the situation with all consequences but the ith 
at their least preferred values, and the ith consequence 
at its most preferred value; and 
(2) an alternative with two possible results: all 
consequences at their most preferred values with prob- 
ability p ,  or all consequences at  their least preferred 
values with probability (1 - p)?' 
The utility value of the first alternative is ci, since x i  
is at  its most preferred value (U,(xl) = I), and all other 
consequences are a t  their least preferred values (l$(xj*) 
= 0, j Z i ) ;  the expected utility of the second alternative 
is p ,  since there is a chance p of obtaining the most 
preferred situation (which has a utility value of l ) ,  
and a chance 1 ,- p of obtaining the least preferred 
situation (which has a utility value of 0). For the 
decision-maker to be indifferent to the choice between 
these two alternatives the utility value of the first 
alternative must equal the expected utility of the second 
alternative. Therefore, ci = p ,  and ci is a positive r~umber 
less than 1. 
If fl= ci = 1 , the utility function is of the pure sum 
form and has been totally specified. If f lZlci  # 1, the 
pure product form is appropriate and a value for c 
must be obtained. The utility function U,(Xi) for each 
consequence is scaled from 0 to  1 ; c is needed so that 
U(X)may also be scaled from 0 to 1. U(X) should be 
1 for the most preferred condition, when each of the 
Uf i )  equals 1, and U(X) is 0 when each of the UkXi) 
equals 0; therefore c must satisfy 1 + c = n z  (1 + cci). 
If z K l c i  > 1, the multi-consequence utility function 
exhibits multi-consequence risk aversion, and -1 < c 
< 0 ;  if z z 1 c i  < 1, the utility function exhibits multi- 
consequence risk seeking, and c > 0.  
2.5. Reference function assessment 
The preference assessment process was divided into 
two parts. The first dealt with the effects in one year 
(described by a set of attributes), while the second 
covered intertemporal preferences. The preference 
function for each interest group was assessed over the 
following four attributes: 
X,  = capacity at a site, measured by the number of 
1000 MW units at  a coastal site; 
X z  = incremental dollar costs, measured by the cost 
of thermal pollution abatement equipment plus trans- 
mission cost expressed as a percent of the minimum 
cost plant; 
X3 = radiation hazard, measured by the population 
within 15 miles of the nuclear facility times the number 
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of units affecting the population (referred to  as popula- 
tion equivalent); and 
X4 = thermal pollution level, the end-of-pipe tem- 
perature of the nuclear facility measured in O F .  
These attributes were defined on the basis of  in- 
formation provided by a number of individuals who 
had previously participated in siting controversies, 
and they cover the important factors involved in the 
deployment of  nuclear power plants to  coastal sites. 
The second attribute, for instance, includes the costs 
o f  lowering pollution - the cost of lowering thermal 
pollution by having a better thermal pollution control 
system and the cost of  lowering radiation hazard by 
moving a plant away from its load. (The minimum- 
cost plant is a plant with once-through cooling and 
no long-distance EHV transmission.) The third 
attribute covers radiation effects from normal plant 
operation and from an uncontrolled plant, and its 
definition is based on the fact that the effects of 
radiation on an individual are proportional t o  the 
level o f  radiation, and the level of radiation from a 
plant is proportional to  the number of units in the 
plant; the probability of abnormal occurrences (reactor 
uncontrolled) is approximately proportional t o  the 
number o f  units. Fifteen miles is the maximum lethal 
distance cited in the most widely distributed report 
considering nuclear plant accidents [8] +. The last 
attribute, end-of-pipe temperature, was chosen because 
it is what is measured now in the monitoring of 
coastal sites. 
To obtain the preference assessments, I had two 
meetings with each of the knowledgeable observers. At 
the first meeting I explained the choice of attributes, 
outlined the procedure t o  be followed at the second 
meeting (when the formal preference assessment was 
to  be made), and discussed the concepts o f  utility 
independence and preferential dependence. I asked 
a series of single-attribute assessment questions (the 
remaining attributes were set at different values) t o  
determine whether one of the attributes was utility 
independent of  its complement. It usually was, t o  a 
This is not to say tha! everyone within 15 miles of a plant 
site will be affected equally badly by radiation from the 
plant; those close to the plant will be affected more than 
those farther away. The population within 15 miles of a site 
is a representative density around this site; it provides a 
means of comparing the population densities surrounding 
different sites. 
good approximation, and the assessor generally thought 
that it was reasonable t o  assume that the other attributes 
were also utility independent of  their complements; 
however, I did not have time t o  ask assessment questions 
to  confirm that utility independence holds for each 
attribute. In addition, several questions were asked t o  
determine if pairs of attributes were preferentially 
independent of their complements. 
At the second meeting we began the assessment 
process by considering incremental dollar costs. Incre- 
mental dollar costs are calculated as the ratio of the 
sum of  thermal pollution abatement costs and trans- 
mission costs (discounted at 10%) t o  the costs of the 
minimum-cost plant. (The minimum-cost plant is a 
plant with once-through cooling and no long-distance 
transmission necessary between the plant and its load.) 
The ratio is in units of  percent, its values ranging from 
0 t o  30%; 30% is an upper limit t o  the ratio, corre- 
sponding t o  a plant as far away as possible with an 
expensive, closed cooling system. 1 started by supposing 
that someone (exactly who depended on  who was 
being questioned) has two plant designs - the most 
expensive (30%) and the cheapest (0%) - that  are 
equivalent in all other attributes. He/she will decide 
between them by flippiqg a coin: heads - most 
expensive, tails - cheapest (the lottery). The alter- 
native to  the lottery is a plant design costing 5%. The 
knowledgeable observer, when asked to choose between 
the lottery and the alternative, usually picked the 
alternative. When a second alternative - a plant costing 
25% over the minimum - was offered instead of the 
lottery, the lottery was usually preferred. Similar 
questions were asked until an indifference point was 
determined; that is, the cost n o  more nor less desirable 
than the lottery. This indifference point has a preference 
value of  0.5. Using that indifference point and the best 
value (the value corresponding to the cheapest plant 
design), the cost with 0.75 preference value was obtained; 
similarly, using the worst value (the value corresponding 
t o  the most expensive plant design), the cost with 0.25 
preference value was obtained. The five points defined 
a preference curve for one attribute. Consistency checks 
were performed and computer programs were used to 
fit curves to  these points [7] . Fig. 1 presents the single- 
attribute preference functions for the environmentalist 
interest group. The number of units a t  a site is a dis- 
crete attribute, all others are continuous, and each curve 
covers the range of interest of the attribute. The prefer- 
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Fig. 1. Single-attribute preference functit 
ence functions for incremental costs and population 
equivalents exhibit the risk aversion that was expected. 
The shape of the curve for temperature is consistent with 
the safety of the fish species menhaden (the most 
economically important,  endangered fish species 
indigenous t o  New England coastal waters). If the 
water temperature is above 90°F, menhaden are 
killed; below 88"F, they are safe; while between 8 8  and 
90°F the fish are endangered, and their condition 
deteriorates rapidly. The environmentalist interest 
group's multi-attribute preference function describing 
effects in one year is 
Reference functions were also assessed for the other 
three interest groups. 
I was also interested in preferences over the 4 0  yr 
time horizon of the power plant siting study. For each 
of the knowledgeable observers, the preferences for 
lotteries in any individual year were utility independent 
of preferences for lotteries over the other years. In 
addition, preferences for the attributes in each pair 
of years were found t o  be preferentially independent 
of preferences for the attributes in the other years. 
Hence the 4 0  yr preference function was either the pure 
X4:END-OF-PIPE TEMPERATURE (OF) 
ons for environmentalist interest groups. 
sum or pure product form. Because of the knowledgeable 
observers' desire to spread risks over the years, the 
multi-year, risk averse, pure product form was selected 
as appropriate. 
3. Conclusions and further considerations 
The model identified a variety of  Pareto-admissible 
deployment decisions, and some sites were found to 
dominate the others for most sets of political weightst. 
The model can best be used to separate those sites that 
deserve further consideration from those that don't; it 
is low in cost and analyzes many of the broad trade-offs 
involved in the deployment of nuclear power plants t o  
coastal sites. The application of analytic techniques to 
the problem of power plant investment decision making 
is no t  a new one. Many other studies have considered 
such units, but what makes this one unique is its in- 
clusion of many interest groups in one analysis. The 
preference assessments described are a first step toward 
obtaining preference functions that will be useful in 
considering the broad trade-offs in nuclear power plant 
siting decisions. An advantage of the quantification is 
that the analyst does not  have to specify levels of  
'f A total o f  30 Pareto-admissible decisions were found for 
the scenario under certainty. For the second scenario, under 
which the federal government may restrict units to closed 
cooling systems, 27 Pareto-admissible decisions were found. 
Details on these decisions are described in ref. 19 ) .  
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environmental indicators, such as end-of-pipe tem- 
perature, as constraints; the preference functions can 
be used to specify the optimal levels for different 
situations. 
Because of time limitations, however, a number of  
issues could not be considered in the formal preference 
assessment. To  begin with, the preference assessment 
did not touch on  differences among the interest groups 
of the six New England states. Some states may have 
weak environmental groups and regulatory agencies; 
the utilities may exploit this weakness and locate 
additional generating units in these states. The model 
presented in this paper makes no distinction among 
the states: the same preference functions and political 
weights are used for the interest groups no matter in 
which state a site is located. A more reasonable - and 
more time-consuming- approach would be to assess 
the preferences for each site separately, and assign a 
different set of political weights to each site. Another 
consideration is the uneven distribution of sites among 
the New England states. Maine, with the longest coast- 
line, has half of the proposed sites, and under some 
of the hreto-admissible deployment schemes Maine 
would have three of the first five new generating plants 
- many more plants than would be required to satisfy 
its own needs. Maine's reaction to such plans was not 
considered in the model. 
AU preference assessments quantify a person's 
attitudes toward change in the value of a set of proxy 
variables. In this study several of the proxy variables 
cover more than one environmental effect. Population 
equivalent, for instance, covers radiation effects from 
normal plant operation as well as from an uncontrolled 
plant. Another approach to the assessment problem 
would be to consider each of these environmental 
effects separately so that there would be n o  confusion 
about what the proxy variable refers to. For normal 
plant operation the knowledgeable observer could 
assess the amount of radiation affecting the population; 
for an uncontrolled plant, the number of people killed 
in an accident and the associated probability of an 
uncontrolled unit could be used in the assessment. 
A similar case can be made for separating the effects 
of  end-of-pipe temperature. The knowledgeable 
observer for electric utilities could assess separately 
the preference values of different amounts of fish 
killed and of the different effects of temperature on  
electric system operation. (The amount a power plant 
is derated depends on the plant's end-of-pipe tem- 
perature.) 
To  obtain the preference function for each interest 
group, I chose a knowledgeable observer familiar with 
many of the group members' preferences. Each know- 
ledgeable observer assessed the preference function for 
one interest group, considering just the point of view 
of that particular group. Alternatively, these preference 
functions could include the preferences of other 
interest groups. For instance, an electric utility company 
is interested in satisfying its customers' preference for 
energy, in minimizing the conflict with environmenta- 
lists and regulatory agencies, and in maximizing the 
net benefits of its facilities to  the local communities. 
These additional inputs into the electric company's 
decision process could be handled either explicitly or 
implicitly. The preference function for electric utilities 
could include the preference function values of the other 
interest groups in its arguments, or the knowledgeable 
observer could be asked t o  consider the influence of 
the other interest groups when he/she makes the 
assessments. 
These and other problematic features of the assess- 
ment need t o  be considered in future modeling efforts. 
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